Arbitration vs. Litigation: The Right to Appeal and Other Misperceptions
Fueling the Preference for a Judicial Forum
By Rebecca Callahan
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Introduction

On average over the last five years, Californians have initiated approximately 1.4 million
civil actions each year.1 According to the data collected by the California Judicial Council,
approximately 70 percent of all civil matters were dismissed or disposed of each year by means
other than trial.2 For matters that proceed to trial, approximately 28 percent are bench trials and
only about two percent were jury trials.3 California’s disposition experience is consistent with
statewide trends which show that jury trials have always represented only a tiny fraction of all

1

See, Appendix 1 for summary of statistics compiled by the California Judicial Council. In addition to general
business disputes, the “civil action” statistics include probate, family law, small claims and personal injury matters.
2

Id.

3

Id.

civil dispositions4 and that disposition by trial has been declining over the past two decades.5
This empirical data suggests that while the courts may be the place where people assert their civil
grievances, it is not the place where most such disputes are decided.
For many reasons which are beyond the scope of this paper, alternatives to litigation have
blossomed over the past quarter century and include a wide variety of practices. Among those
alternatives is private arbitration where the parties submit their disputes to a neutral for binding
resolution in a nonjudicial setting. One of the hallmarks of the arbitration process is that it is
flexible, allowing parties to craft the process by which their dispute is resolved, to select their
decision maker, to schedule their matter for hearing according to their personal calendars and to
keep the particulars about their dispute private. Another cornerstone of arbitration is that it
offers finality, which generally translates into less time and money spent on the dispute
resolution process. Even though there are clear benefits associated with arbitration, it is not the
preferred method for resolving civil disputes. To the contrary, there is a perception that
attorneys prefer and will recommend litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism to be
employed by their clients, and that one of the leading reasons for this preference is the
availability of the right to take an appeal should they be unsatisfied with the outcome after trial.
Since the right to appeal is only triggered after a trial is concluded and judgment is entered, the
disposition statistics discussed above, coupled with the low reversal rate statistics discussed in
Section 3 of this paper,6 suggest that the availability of appellate review may not always be a
good reason for preferring litigation over arbitration.
In connection with the research for this paper, approximately 400 business litigators in
Southern California were surveyed in November 2005 to test the perception that attorneys
generally prefer litigation over arbitration for the resolution of general civil disputes. As
4

For the past two decades, jury trials have represented one percent or less of all civil dispositions. Paula
Hannaford-Agor, Robert C. LaFountain and Shauna Strickland, Trial Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice
System, Caseload Highlights / Examining the Work of State Courts, Vol. 11, No. 1 (June 2005),
http://www/ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/Highlights/Vol11No3.pdf.

5

“Bench and jury trials have been declining steadily for the past twenty years, both in absolute numbers and as a
proportion of all civil dispositions.” Id. Data for civil dispositions and trial rates collected from 22 states during the
period of 1984 through 2002 shows that while there was a 46 percent increase in civil dispositions during that time
period, that increase closely tracks the population growth in those states during the same period. That same data
shows that trial dispositions fell from 36 percent in 1984 to 16 percent in 2002, representing a 49 percent overall
decline. Id.
6

See, Tables 7 and 8, infra.
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discussed below, the survey showed that approximately 87 percent of the responding attorneys
do prefer litigation over arbitration and that one of the reasons for this preference is the
availability of appellate review.7 The purpose of this paper is to examine the survey results and
to discuss some of the misperceptions that exist concerning the value of appellate review in the
courts, as well as the misperception that further review is not available in arbitration proceedings.
The survey also asked attorneys to state any other reasons they might have for preferring
litigation over arbitration. This question elicited a broad assortment of responses.8 Those
responses revealed bad experiences in arbitration; lack of confidence in arbitrators as decision
makers; a higher level of comfort and confidence in the court system based on training and
experience; and frustration with arbitrators deciding matters by “splitting the baby” and not
following legal precedent.9 Another purpose of this paper is to examine these responses and
discuss some of the perceptions behind them.
The survey which is the basis for this paper establishes the contours of a relatively
consistent image of arbitration as contrasted with litigation. To be sure, it is a broad brush
portrait, but one that nevertheless shows a preference for litigation based on perceived
shortcomings associated with the arbitration process and misperceived attributes associated with
the litigation process. In this paper, the survey findings are used to demystify the arbitration
process in an effort to present arbitration as a more attractive alternative to litigation.
2.

A Comparison of the Litigation and Arbitration Processes
A.

Civil Litigation

Civil litigation is a process through which a remedy is sought through the courts.10
Within the framework of shared governmental responsibilities that defines our democratic
system of government, the primary role of the judiciary is to provide an accessible forum for the

7

Of the 113 attorneys who responded to the survey, 103 responded to the “preference” question. Of those, 90
confirmed that they generally prefer litigation over arbitration because of the right to take an appeal.

8

See, Table 12, infra, and Appendix 2 for summary of responses given with respect to other reasons for preferring
litigation over arbitration.

9

10

Id.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 20.
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just resolution of disputes.11 Court proceedings are a public process12 and, with limited
exceptions, are open to the public.13
Courts exist for the purpose of determining controversies between litigants according to
their respective rights under the law.14 In the words of Justice Tobriner, courts exist “primarily
to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties.”15 Judicial
power is limited, however, to deciding legal disputes.16 Courts have no power to prevent
breaches of moral duties which violate no law,17 and they are not constituted or operated for
moral vindication.
11

The powers of the government of the state are divided into three separate departments – the legislative, executive
and judicial branches. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judicial power represents one of the three powers of government.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Statewide judicial power may be exercised by only three courts enumerated in the
Constitution: namely, the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal and the superior courts. Id., §§ 2, 3 and 4.
12

“A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property.” Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
374, 91 L.Ed. 1546, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).

13

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 124, 125. The concept of a public trial was explained by the Supreme Court in People v.
Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894) (“Hartman”):
“The trial should be public in the ordinary common-sense acceptation of the term. The doors of
the courtroom are expected to be kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted, and the trial is
to be public in all respects, as we have before suggested, with due regard to the size of the
courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right to exclude objectionable characters and youth
of tender years, and to do other things which may facilitate the proper conduct of the trial.”
Id. at 245; see also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178, 1192, 980 P.2d
337, 86 Cal.Rptr. 778 (1999) (citing the Hartman decision favorably in a civil context and rejecting the
suggestion that California Code of Civil Procedure section 124 was intended to apply to criminal cases only
and not to civil cases). Other reasons for promoting public access to the courts are the “traditional AngloAmerican distrust for secret trials,” and the desire to safeguard against any attempt to employ the courts “as
instruments of persecution.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269-270, 92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1947).
14

Warner v. The F. Thomas Parisian Dyeing and Cleaning Works, 105 Cal. 409, 412, 38 P. 960 (1895); Vecki v.
Sorensen, 171 Cal. App. 2d 390, 393, 340 P.2d 1020 (1959). A civil action is defined as the prosecution of an action
by one party against another for the declaration, enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of
a wrong. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 30.

15

Vecki v. Sorensen, supra, 171 Cal. App. 2d at 393.

16

Dabney v. Dabney, 104 Cal. App. 4th 379, 383, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (2002) (No court has inherent authority to
decide a matter for which there is no legally recognized cause of action.) See also U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2
(limiting the “judicial Power of the United States” to “cases” and “controversies”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth,
300 U.S. 227, 241, 81 L.Ed. 617, 57 S.Ct. 461 (1937) (stating that federal adjudication requires "a concrete case
admitting of an immediate and definite determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding
upon the facts alleged").
17

16 Cal .Jur. 3d, Courts § 30.
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Relief through civil litigation is accomplished through the prosecution of an action by
one party against another for the declaration, enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress
or prevention of a wrong.18 It is an involuntary process in the sense that it can be commenced by
one party without the advance knowledge or consent of the other party.
Court proceedings are governed by a variety of statutes and court rules.19 So stringent are
the rules governing civil litigation proceedings that the failure to adhere to those rules may serve
as grounds for disposing of the matter without reaching the merits.20 For disputes that do
proceed to trial, the object of the proceedings is to discover where the truth lies and to bring
about substantial justice in accordance with fixed rules of law and procedure.21 While final
responsibility for administering justice in the courts rests with the judge,22 the judge is not
empowered and has no duty to investigate or initiate proceedings on behalf of the litigants.23

18

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 30.

19

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1, et seq.; Cal. R. Ct. 1-78 (Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal); Cal. R. Ct.
200-892 (Trial Courts); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1,et seq .
20

For example, if the plaintiff fails to serve and return summons on the complaint within three years after the
action is commenced, the action may not be further prosecuted and shall be dismissed. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 583.250. For another example, if a party engages in conduct which is found to constitute a misuse of the
discovery processes, the court may issue and order dismissing the action of that party. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 2023.030(d)(3).

21

Buchman v. Buchman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 267 P.2d 73 (1954).
“To judge in a contested proceeding implies the hearing of evidence from both sides in open court,
a comparison of the merits of the evidence of each side, a conclusion from the evidence of where
the truth lies, application of the appropriate laws to the facts found, and the rendition of a
judgment accordingly.”

Id. at 560.
22

People v. Hambrick, 162 Cal. App. 2d 239, 143, 327 P.2d 570 (1958).

23

State of Missouri v. Goodman, 406 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1966).
“With few exceptions, the forte of any court is to relegate itself to limbo until presented proper
pleadings to be employed as vehicles for judicial locomotion. Even in matters over which a court
has general jurisdiction, it cannot, ex mero motu, set itself in motion nor have power to determine
questions unless they are presented to it in the manner and form prescribed by law. Jurisdiction to
decide concrete issues in a particular case is limited to those presented by the parties in their
pleadings, and anything beyond is coram non judice and void.”

Id. at 126.

5

Courts essentially are “passive forums”24 where the litigants determine the scope of the inquiry
and the information on which the judgment will be based via their statement of the issues to be
decided, their statement of the relief to be awarded or denied, and the evidence offered and
admitted at the time of trial.25
Whether a matter is tried by a jury or before a judge, the proceeding is concluded by the
entry of judgment.26 All aspects of verdicts and judgments are governed by statute. In the case
of a jury verdict, judgment is entered by the court clerk in conformity with the verdict and must
be so entered within 24 hours after the rendition of the verdict.27 The jury is not required to
explain the basis for its decision28 unless it has been instructed, prior to deliberations, to provide
a special verdict29 or to answer specific questions in combination with returning a general
verdict.30 The verdict must be in writing and signed by the foreman.31 In the case of a bench
trial, the judge must issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for his
decision.32 The statement of decision can be made orally unless any party appearing at the trial

24

Sale v. Railroad Comm’n of the State of California, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 617, 104 P.2d 38 (1940).

25

Id.; see also 16 Cal. Jur. 3d, Courts § 30.

26

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.

27

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 624-628. In civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors (i.e., 9 out of 12) must agree upon the
verdict. CAL. CONST. art. L, § 16; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 618.
28

A general verdict is the most common type of jury verdict and simply renders a decision in favor of one party or
the other on all issues submitted to them. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 624. A general verdict implies a finding in favor
of the prevailing party of every fact essential to the support of his action or defense. Henderson v. Harnischfeger
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 673, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).

29

A special verdict is one by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the judgment to the Court. Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 624. A special verdict must present conclusions of fact (i.e., ultimate facts) established by the evidence
rather than the evidence itself and those ultimate facts must be presented so that nothing remains for the Court to do
other than drawing conclusions of law. Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc., 78 Cal.
App.4th 847, 871, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (2000).
30

The trial judge may instruct the jury to answer specific questions of fact, to be stated in writing, to test the
validity of the general verdict. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 625; Hurlbut v. Sonora Comm. Hosp., 207 Cal. App. 3d 388,
403, 254 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1989).

31

Id.

32

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 632.
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requests a written decision.33 Under either scenario, the verdict and statement of decision are not
enforceable until judgment is entered.34 Once judgment is entered, the trial court loses
jurisdiction to amend or set aside the judgment, except in the context of post-trial motions
seeking a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.35
The entry of judgment on the court’s docket is that which makes it eligible for
enforcement against the judgment debtor.36 The entry of judgment allows the judgment creditor
to levy against all property of the judgment debtor,37 except as may be provided by law.38 The
entry of judgment also opens the door to a possible second set of court proceedings: namely,
appellate review which available for any judgment entered by the Superior Court.39
Like the trial proceedings leading up to the entry of judgment, appeals are governed by a
strict set of rules that must be followed in order to obtain review. The first of those rules requires
the timely filing of a notice of appeal with the Superior Court.40 Thereafter, the party seeking
33

Id. Any request for a written statement of decision must be made within 10 days after the court announces its
tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one
day, in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision. Id.
34

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 664.

35

APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 4th 176, 182, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 (1999); Rochin v. Pat Johnson
Mfg. Co., 67 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1238, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (1998).

36

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.010.

37

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 695.010-695.070.

38

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 703.010-704.995.

39

There is a distinction between appellate jurisdiction and the right to appeal that is sometimes overlooked or
misunderstood. 9 Witkin, California Procedure, Appeal, § 2, p. 60 (4th ed. 1997). Appellate jurisdiction is derived
from the California Constitution and cannot be destroyed or abridged by Legislative action or inaction. In re
Establishment of Perris City News, 96 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 1197, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (2002) (statute specifying that
appeal of judgment deciding general circulation petition could be heard by California Supreme Court improperly
abridged appellate jurisdiction constitutionally reserved to Courts of Appeal); In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass
Assessment, 190 Cal. App. 532, 537, 213 P. 974 (1923) (Legislature cannot indirectly destroy or limit the
constitutional right by means of a change in procedure); Byers v. Smith, 4 Cal. 2d 209, 214, 47 P.2d 705 (1935)
(same); In re Shafter-Wasco Irr. Dist., 55 Cal. App. 2d 484, 487, 130 P.2d 755 (1942) (same). There is no
constitutional right to an appeal. In re Taya C., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (1991). The right of a party
to appeal is wholly statutory and no judgment or order is appealable unless expressly made so by statute. Id.; see
also Landau v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 4th 191, 198, 206, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54 (1998) (holding that Cal. Bus. &
Prof. C. § 2337 limiting review in medical disciplinary proceedings to extraordinary writ is constitutional); Powers
v. Richmond, 10 Cal. 4th 85, 89-90, 893 P.2d 1160, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839 (1995) (holding that Cal. Govt. C. §
6259(c) limiting superior court decisions in Public Records Act cases to extraordinary writ is constitutional).
40

Cal. R. Ct. 1(a)(1). Notices of appeal and cross-appeal must be filed within the time periods established by
Rules 2 and 3 of the California Rules of Court. These deadlines are jurisdictional, meaning that the timely filing is
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appellate review (the appellant) must designate an adequate record so as to enable the reviewing
court to be able to evaluate the claimed error in the trial proceedings.41 The appellant must also
provide the appellate court with a brief that identifies the perceived problems in the trial
proceedings and cites the court to the legal authorities that make the resulting judgment in
error.42 In this regard, the fundamental difference between the trial and appellate proceedings is
that the purpose of an appeal is not to determine the case on its merits, but to review for trial
court error.43 The purpose of the appellate process is not to retry the case, but to review action
taken in the trial court, all the while giving substantial deference to the trial court’s resolution of
disputed facts and the exercise of its discretion regarding the administration of the proceedings.44
B.

Contractual Arbitration

Long before law was established, or courts were organized, or judges had formulated
principles of law, civilized society resorted to other mechanisms for the resolution of disputes.
Arbitration was one such mechanism.45 It is an adjudicatory, as opposed to an advisory, process

an absolute prerequisite to the appellate court’s power to entertain the appeal. Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v.
Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 51, 56, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166 (1997). In civil cases,
courts have no inherent authority to excuse a tardy notice of appeal or otherwise extend or shorten the time for
appeal. Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 579, 582, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (2002).
Likewise, appellate jurisdiction may not be conferred by party consent or stipulation. Hollister Convalescent Hosp.,
Inc. v. Rico, 15 Cal. 3d 660, 666, 125 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1975). It is the timely filing of a notice of appeal that vests
jurisdiction in the appellate court and, subject to certain exceptions, terminates the lower court’s jurisdiction. Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 916.
41

Cal. R. Ct. 4-7. The penalty for failing to timely procure the record is default. Cal. R. Ct. 8; see also Marriage
of Wilcox, 124 Cal. App. 4th 492, 498-499, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315 (2004) (it is not the appellate court’s responsibility
to independently acquire documents from the trial court).
42

Cal. R. Ct. 13-18.

43

See In re Zeth S., 31 Cal. 4th 396, 404, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683 (2003). The courts of appeal do not supplant the trial
courts as the original forum for consideration of the facts and evidence, nor do they reweigh the evidence or reassess
witness credibility. Uriate v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 51 Cal. App. 4th 222, 235, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412
(2001).
44

Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 658, 667, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (1998). An appeal
does not give losing litigants a second bite at the apple. James B. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1021, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (1995). The court of appeal is not a second trier of fact. Marriage of Calcaterra & Badakhsh, 132
Cal. App. 4th 28, 31, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 246 (2005).

45

For example, between 500 BC and 300 BC, the Greek city-states used arbitration extensively for settling disputes
concerning boundary delimitation. Edwin R. Teple and Robert B. Moberly, Arbitration and Conflict Resolution
(BNA 1979), pp. 1-7, citing 1 Cor. VI 5. Arbitration was an accepted practice under Roman law. Id., citing H.B.
Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law (1966), p. 659. It was similarly practiced in ancient Babylon and was an established
institution of early Islamic society. Id. Other accounts of early and diverse experiences with arbitration are recited
in F. Kellor, American Arbitration (1948); E. Walover, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 18
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because the arbitrator renders a decision at the end of an arbitration hearing that is final and
binding upon the parties. The arbitration award is binding because the parties agreed to accept
the arbitrator’s determination of the issues as an alternative to litigation in the courts and a
decision by a judge.46 Modern arbitration differs significantly from earlier common law
arbitration in this regard, because it encourages the use of arbitration for future, as well as
existing, disputes and provides for enforcement of such pre-dispute agreements.47
Private arbitration is a voluntary process which arises when parties agree to submit their
disputes to a neutral (or panel of neutrals) for resolution in a nonjudicial setting.48 It is a process
which arises from and is dictated by contract. “[I]t only comes into play when the parties to the
dispute have agreed to submit to it,”49 and can validly take place only if the parties have
specifically agreed to use this method for the settlement of their dispute.50 When parties contract
to have their disputes resolved through arbitration, both state and federal law provide for
enforcement of those agreements51 in accordance with strong public policy.52

U. Pa. L. Rev. 132 (1934); W. Jones, 3 Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York, 1956 Wash. U. L. Q. 193.
Arbitration has also been used extensively throughout America’s history to resolve issues such as ownership of
colonies, ownership of particular pieces of territory, recovery of money owed by one state to another, and in all sorts
of religious matters. Arbitration in Action, Vol. 1, Nos. 4-5 (April-May 1943), p. 5. In the early Anglo-Norman
period, it was difficult to distinguish between jury determinations and arbitration proceedings. The courts during
that period had a well-developed conception of the essential attributes of a valid arbitration proceeding, and the jury
system developed as an outgrowth of the arbitral concept. The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1961), p. 193.
46

Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 396, 401-402 & fn. 5, 696 P.2d 645, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985).

47

Manual for Commercial Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association at 12 (2004) (“AAA Manual”).

48

Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 944, 955, 116 P.3d 479, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5 (2005); Madden
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 17 Cal. 3d 699, 713, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976). Contractual
arbitration is quite different from judicial arbitration where, by statute, California law requires that certain actions be
diverted before trial to “judicial arbitration.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1141.10, et seq. For one thing, there is no preexisting agreement to arbitrate. For another, a judicial arbitration award is not binding on the parties. Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1141.20.
49

Herman Feil, Inc. v. Design Center of Los Angeles, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 1414, 251 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1988); see
also 6 Witkin, California Procedure, Proceedings Without Trial, § 484, p. 912 (4th ed. 1997).
50

AAA Manual, supra.

51

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.) was enacted in 1925 and declares a national policy
favoring arbitration of disputes. In this regard, Section 2 of the FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate
in any contract involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Similarly, the
present Arbitration Act in California (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1280, et seq.) was enacted in 1961 and provides “a
comprehensive, all-inclusive statutory scheme applicable to all written agreements to arbitrate disputes.” American
Home Assur. Co. v. Benowitz, 234 Cal. App. 3d 192, 198, 285 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1991); see Crown Homes v. Landes,

9

Though the law favors agreements for arbitration of disputes, there is no policy compelling
persons to accept binding arbitration.53 Absent a clear statement of consent to arbitrate, an
agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration will not be inferred.54 Similarly, even with an
agreement to arbitrate, the scope of what is subject to arbitration is limited by the parties’
agreement and can be further limited by parties through a post-dispute agreement as to what
issues will or will not be submitted to the arbitrator for decision.55
California statutory and case law does not define arbitration procedure.56 As such, an
arbitration proceeding may take many procedural forms,57 and an agreement’s failure to identify
a set of grievance procedures will not be fatal to the use of arbitration as a binding mechanism
for resolving disputes.58 Statutorily, all that is required for a dispute resolution proceeding to
qualify as an arbitration proceeding is that it must have a third-party decision maker selected by
the parties; a mechanism for ensuring neutrality in the rendering of the decision; an opportunity
for both sides to be heard; and a final and binding decision.59 It is not necessary that the term

22 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1276, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827 (1994). The California Arbitration Act mirrors the FAA and
provides that a written agreement to arbitrate “is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
for the revocation of any contract.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.
52

Arbitration agreements are liberally interpreted in favor of enforcing such agreements. Izze v. Mesquite Country
Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1315, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1986). The public policy in favor of arbitration that is
evidenced by the enactment of the California Arbitration Act (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1280, et seq.) is incorporated
by implication into all arbitration agreements unless inconsistent with their terms. See Freeman v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 479, 535 P.2d 341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1975); Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. v.
William Blurock & Partners, 111 Cal. App. 3d 983, 993, 169 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1980); American Home Assur. Co. v.
Benowitz, supra, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 198.
53

Victoria v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 734, 744, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).

54

Titan Group, Inc. v. Sonoma Valley County Sanitation Dist., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1129, 211 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1985).

55

See discussion in Section 4(C), infra.

56

6 Witkin, California Procedure, Proceedings Without Trial, supra, § 484 (2005 supp), p. 216.

57

See Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478-479, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488, 109 S.Ct. 1248
(1989) (“Volt”) (whether to arbitrate, how to arbitrate and when to arbitrate are matters that the parties may specify
by contract).

58

Id.

59

Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 50 Cal. App. 4th 676, 684, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (1996) (“ChengCanindin”); Elliot & Ten Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495, 503, 67 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 140
(1997); Saeta v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 261, 268, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (2004). Under California law, the
general rule is that parties to a private arbitration agreement impliedly agree that the arbitrator’s decision will be

10

“arbitration” be used. The key factor is whether the dispute resolution proceeding agreed to by
the parties is intended as a substitute for judicial litigation.60
Even though the components of an arbitration proceeding are not statutorily defined,
many provider organizations have adopted rules that govern the proceedings they administer.61
Such rules include the manner in which an arbitrator will be appointed to hear a given matter,62
the scheduling and conduct of a preliminary hearing or conference,63 the taking or exchange of
any formal or informal discovery,64 the summary disposition of a claim or issue,65 securing
documents or witnesses through subpoena,66 and the conduct of the arbitration hearing.67
An arbitration proceeding is concluded by the issuance of an award. The only statutory
requirements concerning the form of the award is that it must be in writing, signed by the
arbitrator, and include a determination of all questions submitted to the arbitrator that must be

both binding and final. “Indeed, the very essence of the term ‘arbitration’ . . . connotes a binding award.”
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 9, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1992) (“Moncharsh”). Federal courts, however,
are split on whether (a) the arbitration must be binding in order to fall within the FAA, and (b) the agreement must
expressly state that the arbitrator’s decision is judicially enforceable. Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d
1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) (“arbitration need not be binding in order to fall within the scope of the FAA); Rainwater
v. National Home Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 1991) (agreement must provide for binding arbitration, but
such agreement need not be express and may be inferred); PVI, Inc. v. Ratiopharm GmbH, 135 F.3d 1252, 1253 (8th
Cir. 1998) (agreement must expressly state that award is judicially enforceable to comply with 9 U.S.C. § 9);
Oklahoma City Assocs. v. Wall-Mart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Milwaukee
Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 389-390 (7th Cir. 1981) (judicial enforceability
may be inferred); In re I/S Stayborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 426-427 (2d Cir. 1974)
(same).
60

Cheng-Canindin, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at 691-692; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Hardin, 211 Cal. App.
3d 501, 506, 259 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (1989) (agreement that dispute regarding the amount of loss be resolved by an
“appraisal process” constitutes an agreement to arbitrate); Louise Gardens of Encino Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 82 Cal. App. 4th 648, 658, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378 (2000).

61

See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, American Arbitration Association (“AAA
Commercial Rules”), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440; Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JAMS
(“JAMS Rules”), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp.
62

AAA Commercial Rules, supra, §§ R-11-R-16; JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 15.

63

AAA Commercial Rules, supra, § R-20; JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 16.

64

AAA Commercial Rules, supra, § R-21; JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 17.

65

JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 18.

66

AAA Commercial Rules, supra, § R-31; JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 21.

67

AAA Commercial Rules, supra, §§ R-26-36; JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 22.
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decided in order to determine the controversy.68 There are, however, rules governing the award
process that have been adopted by various provider organizations.69 These rules include
bracketing the amounts that may be awarded by the arbitrator (“High-Low Arbitration”),70
instructing the arbitrator to choose between the parties’ last proposals (“Baseball Arbitration”),71
or setting a high and low value and agreeing to accept whichever figure is closest to the
arbitrator’s award (“Night Baseball”).72
As a matter of statutory law, the arbitrator is not required to issue formal findings of fact
or conclusions of law.73 Likewise, the arbitrator is not required to disclose his or her rationale or
reasons for the award.74 However, some provider organizations require that the arbitrator issue
an award that includes a statement of the reasons for the award, unless the parties agree
otherwise.75 Other provider organizations give the parties the option of requesting a “reasoned
award” as part of the process.76
68

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1283.4.

69

The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) was founded in 1926 and is one of the oldest provider
organizations in the world. AAA Manual, pp. 9-10; see also http://www.adr.org/Welcome. According to the AAA
Commercial Rules, the award “shall be made promptly . . . no later than 30 days from the date of closing the
hearing” unless otherwise agreed by the parties or specified by law. AAA Commercial Rules, supra, § R-41. JAMS
is another large provider organization. According to the JAMS Rules, “the Arbitrator shall render the Award within
thirty (30) calendar days after the date of the closing of the Hearing . . . .” JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 24.

70

This is a proceeding wherein the parties agree in advance to the parameters within which the arbitrator may
render his or her award. If the award is lower than the pre-set “low,” the defendant will pay the agreed-upon low
figure. If the award is higher than the pre-set “high,” the plaintiff will accept the agreed-upon high. If the award is
in between, the parties agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s figure. The high and low figures may or may not be
revealed to the arbitrator in advance if the ruling. http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/defined.asp.

71

This is a form of binding arbitration wherein each of the parties chooses one and only one number, and the
arbitrator may select only one of the figures as the award. In this type of proceeding, there are only two possible
outcomes. http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/defined.asp.

72

Like baseball arbitration, this is a form of arbitration wherein the parties exchange their own determination of
that value of the case, but the figures are not revealed to the arbitrator. The arbitrator assigns a value to the case and
the parties agree to accept the high or low figure closes to the arbitrator’s value.
http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/defined.asp.
73

Cothron v. Interinsurance Exchange, 103 Cal. App. 3d 853, 861, 163 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240 (1980).

74

Arco Alaska v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 139, 148, 214 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1985); Baldwin Co. v. Rainey
Const. Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 1058 n. 3, 280 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1990) (“Baldwin”).
75

See, e.g., JAMS Rules, supra, Rule 24.

76

Rule R-42 of the AAA Commercial Rules provides that parties may request a reasoned award but, in order for
that request to be binding on the arbitrator, all parties must request such an award in writing and the request must be
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An arbitrator’s award is not directly enforceable. Until it is confirmed, an award has no
more force or effect than a written contract between the parties to the arbitration.77 In order to
enforce an arbitration award, the prevailing party must ask a judge to confirm the award.78 That
request is made by filing a petition with the court.79 For purposes of creating a record in these
court proceedings, the petition must name as respondents all parties to the arbitration.80 The
petition must also set forth the substance of the arbitration agreement or have a copy attached, it
must identify the arbitrator; and it must set forth or have attached a copy of the award and the
arbitrator’s written opinion, if any.81 The petition must be served on all respondents and a
noticed hearing must be held similar to the type of proceeding had with respect to a petition to
compel arbitration.82 Once confirmed, the arbitration award becomes a judgment of the court,
has the same force and effect as a judgment in a civil action, and may be enforced like any other
judgment of the court in which it is entered.83

made prior to the arbitrator’s appointment. Thereafter, a request for a reasoned award is subject to the discretion of
the arbitrator. A “reasoned award” means an award that includes “either brief or detailed reasons or a written
explanation of the arbitrator’s decision.” Arbitration Awards / Safeguarding, Deciding & Writing Awards,
American Arbitration Association at 42 (2004) (“AAA Awards Manual”). The term “reasoned award” is not
synonymous with formals findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. Beyond what is stated in the arbitrator’s
award, parties may not depose the arbitrator to establish and then challenge his or her reasoning. Hoeft v. MVL
Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 66-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Hoeft”).
77

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1287.6; Jones v. Kvistad, 19 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840, 97 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1971). However,
unless vacated or corrected by the court, an arbitration award is entitled to res judicata and collateral estoppel effect
in any subsequent proceedings. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 5, 14, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 50 (1989) (collateral estoppel effect as to issues “actually, necessarily, and finally” resolved in the arbitration
proceeding); Thibodeau v. Crum, 4 Cal. App. 4th 749, 755, 759, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27 (1992) (res judicata doctrine
applies to an arbitration award, even though unconfirmed, and bars subsequent assertion of claims falling within the
scope of the arbitration).

78

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1285, 1287.4.

79

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1288, 1288.4

80

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285; see Walter v. National Indem. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 630, 634, 83 Cal. Rptr. 803
(1970).

81

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285.4.

82

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1290, et seq.

83

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1287.4; see Britz, Inc. v. Alfa-Laval Food & Dairy Co., 34 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1106, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1995).
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An award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not
subject to judicial review, except on statutory grounds.84 Such relief is sought by petitioning to
vacate the award and may be filed by any party.85 Judicial review for vacatur is limited to the
specific grounds defined by statute, which are directed at the process, not the substance of the
award or the merits of the dispute. Grounds for vacating an award include: the arbitrator
exceeded his powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision;86 the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means or corruption in
any of the arbitrators;87 the award was issued by an arbitrator required to disqualify himself or
herself;88 the rights of the parting challenging the award were substantially prejudiced by the
arbitrator’s refusal to postpone the hearing despite sufficient cause shown for a postponement,

84

See, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(1)-(6); Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at 33. Courts
may not act sua sponte. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1286.4, 1286.8; Valsan Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Calco Space
Facility, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 4th 809, 818, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (1994).
85

Baldwin, supra, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1058.

86

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(4). An arbitrator derives his power solely from parties’
arbitration agreement or the stipulation of submission and he has no legal right to decide issues not submitted by the
parties. Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal. 4th at 8; O’Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 48 Cal. 2d 107, 110, 308 P.2d
9 (1957); Luster v. Collins, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1338, 1346, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (1993). A party’s failure to request
the arbitrator to determine a particular issue within the scope of the arbitration is not a basis for vacating or
correcting an award. Corona v. Amherst Partners, 107 Cal. App. 4th 701, 706, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (2003).
Arbitrators do not exceed their powers because they assign erroneous reasons for their decision. Moncharsh, supra,
3 Cal. 4th at 28. The focus of this inquiry is on whether arbitrators had the power, based on the parties’
submissions, to reach a certain issue, not whether the arbitrator correctly decided the issue. DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir. 1997).

87

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1286.2(a)(1), 1286.2(a)(2). This ground for vacatur applies to
extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the arbitrator or a party (i.e., fraud which deprives the party of a fair hearing). Pacific
Crown Dist v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 1147, 228 Cal. Rptr.2d 645 (1986). It also
applies to “undue” behavior which deprives a party of a “hearty ‘first bite’.” Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., 112
Cal. App. 4th 810, 831, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442 (2003).
88

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(6). Arbitrators conducting arbitrations in California must
comply with the Judicial Council ethics standards which require that an arbitrator make extensive conflict
disclosures to the parties before accepting the appointment and hearing the dispute. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§§ 1281.85, 1281.9 and 1281.91; Cal. R. Ct Appendix, Div. VI. An arbitrator’s failure to comply with the
disclosure requirements may be ground for disqualification of the arbitrator and for vacatur of any award issued.
Ovitz v. Schulman, 133 Cal. 4th 830, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (2005). Likewise, an arbitrator’s failure to honor a
demand for disqualification after making the required conflict disclosures mandates vacatur of any award issued.
Azteca Const., Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 1168-1169, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (2004). An
arbitrator’s mere failure to disclose a conflict is not a basis for vacatur under the FAA. Proof of evident partiality is
required under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d
493, 499-500 (4th Cir. 1999).
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his or her refusal to hear evidence material to the controversy or other misconduct.89
Additionally, both state and federal common law recognize a “public policy” exception to
confirmation of an award, which allows courts to refuse to enforce an arbitration award that
violates well-defined public policy.90
For arbitrations governed by the FAA, there are two additional, common law grounds for
seeking vacatur of an award.91 The first is the “manifest disregard” of the law exception and
allows the award to be vacated where the arbitrator knew applicable law but ignored or refused
to apply it,92 or where an obvious error of law exists.93 The second is the “arbitrary and
89

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(5). Arbitrators are required to decide all questions
submitted that are necessary to determine the controversy. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1283.4. Failure to do so may
constitute “other conduct” for vacatur. Muldrow v. Norris, 12 Cal. 331 (1859) (“Muldrow”). A party challenging
an award on this ground bears the a “heavy burden” because it is presumed that all issues submitted have been
decided. Rodrigues v. Keller, 113 Cal. App. 3d 838, 841, 170 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1980). To overcome that
presumption, the party challenging the award must show that its claims were expressly raised and not decided by the
arbitrator. Id. This is difficult to do because findings are usually not required or part of the award. Id. In the case
of a monetary award without findings, the decision that one of the parties should pay the other a sum of money “is
sufficiently determinative of all items embraced in the submission.” Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal .2d 515, 522-523,
212 P.2d 233 (1949).

90

In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that courts can decline to enforce an arbitrator’s award where
enforcement “would violate ‘some explicit public policy’ that is ‘well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained
by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’”
United Paperworkers’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.. 484 U.S. 29, 43, 98 L.Ed. 2d 286, 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987)
(“United Paperworkers”); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1191-1192 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“Exxon”) (vacating labor arbitration award that required the reinstatement of a seaman who was found to
be highly intoxicated while on duty), or a party’s statutory rights. Board of Education, Etc. v. Round Valley
Teachers Ass’n, 13 Cal. 4th 269, 277, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 (1996) (vacating arbitration award that required school
district to comply with collective bargaining agreement procedure for termination a probationary teacher which was
preempted by conflicting Education Code provisions). This exception arises out of the contract defense to
enforcement where a contract is found to violate public policy. Vimar Sequros y Reaseguros S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540, 132 L.Ed. 2d 462, 115 S.Ct. 2322 (1995). This exception derives legitimacy from the
public’s interest in having its views represented in matters to which it is not a party but which could harm the public
interest. Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Di Russa, supra, 121
F.3d at 824-825.
91

AAA Awards Manual, supra, p. 10.

92

See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991) (vacatur allowed for
arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.
93

See, e.g., International Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1996) (vacatur allowed for error of
law which is obvious and capable of being instantly perceived by the average arbitrator); Roadway Package System,
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2000), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1020 (2001) (“Roadway”) (same); see also
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 104 L.Ed. 2d 526, 109 S.Ct. 1917 (1989);
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 131 L.Ed. 2d 985, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995); Halligan v. Pipe
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, 896 F.2d 745 (3d Cir.
1990); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Bowen”).
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capricious” exception and allows the award to be vacated where no ground for the decision can
be inferred from the facts, which is not yet uniformly accepted.94
Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited in California and the Ninth Circuit to the
statutory and common law FAA grounds discussed above.95 This is so even if the parties agreed
between themselves for an expanded scope of review96 and even if the arbitrator committed an
error of law.97
94

See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (11th Cir. 1997). If no ground for the
decision can be inferred from the facts, the award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious. Brown v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000). Likewise, if an award is “so palpably faulty that no
judge . . . could ever conceivably have made such a ruling,” the award may be vacated as arbitrary and capricious.
Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Safeway
Stores”). The award may also be vacated if it is found to be “completely irrational.” French v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (“French”); G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. v.
Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096 (9th 2003) (same).
95

Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 9-12; Zueta v. County of San Benito, 38 Cal.App.4th 106, 110, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
678 (1995); see also French, 784 F.2d at 906 (under the FAA, “confirmation is required even in the face of
erroneous findings of fact or misinterpretations of law”). The statutory grounds for vacatur specifically do not allow
the court to review the merits of the controversy. Sufficiency of evidence to support the award is immaterial.
Morris v. Zuckerman, 69 Cal. 2d 686, 691, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1968). Validity of the arbitrator’s reasoning is also
immaterial. The case law is clear that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. Id.;
Department of Public Health, Etc. v. Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 790, 215 Cal. App. 3d 429, 433 n. 5, 263
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1989). Similarly, the interpretation of the underlying contract is ordinarily a question of law for the
arbitrator to decide because it is the arbitrator’s construction that was bargained for. United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1424, 80 S.Ct. 1358 (1960); Safeway
Stores, supra, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 438.
96

The law in California is clear that parties cannot contractually expand the scope of judicial review to include
review on the merits. Crowell v. Downey Community Hosp. Found., 95 Cal. App. 4th 730, 739, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d
810 (2002) (“Crowell”); Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v. CC Partners, 101 Cal. App. 4th 635, 645,
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (2002) (“CC Partners”); see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. 29 Cal.4th 1064, 63 P.3d 979,
130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (2003) (“Little”). Likewise, parties cannot stipulate to vacate a decision of the court. U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29, 130 L.Ed. 2d 233, 115 S.Ct. 386 (1994) (judicial
precedents are not the property of the litigants). The federal circuit courts of appeals are split, however, on the issue
of whether parties can contract for expanded judicial review. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits have indicated
that they are willing to honor contract provisions which expand judicial review beyond that provided by Section
10(a) of the FAA. See, Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 2002); Hughes Training
Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2001); Roadway, supra, 257 F.3d at 292-293, cert denied, 534 U.S. 1020
(2001); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995). These circuits generally
emphasize that the purpose of the FAA is to enforce the terms of private arbitration agreements, including terms
specifying the scope of review of arbitration decisions. More specifically, these circuits find support for upholding
the parties’ contractual choice of additional grounds for review in the Volt, supra, 489 U.S. 468, in which the
Supreme Court determined that just as private parties may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so
too may they specify by contract the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted. Id. at 478-479. Opinions
from the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary or hinted that contractual expansion of
judicial review of arbitration awards will not be enforced. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1098, 157 L.Ed. 2d 810, 124 S.Ct. 980 (2004) (“Kyocera”);
Bowen, supra, 254 F.3d at 932; UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sciences corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998);
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Chicago
Typographical”). These circuits generally emphasize that the FAA provides for extremely limited review authority
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In addition to judicial review at the trial court level through the petition to confirm or
vacate process, any judgment entered on the award is appealable98 and is subject to the rules and
procedures described in Section 2(A) of this paper. Likewise, an order denying a petition to
confirm the award is appealable.99 The scope of this appellate review is limited, however, to
whether the trial court erred in granting or denying a petition to confirm or vacate the arbitration
award. It does not extend to a review of the merits of the arbitration award or to de novo review
of the arbitration proceedings. The appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if
substantial evidence supports them and must draw every reasonable inference to support the
award.100 On issues concerning whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, the appellate
court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo, but must give substantial deference to the
arbitrator’s assessment of his or her contractual authority.101
C.

Conclusion

On their face, litigation and arbitration appear to be from the same dispute resolution
family in terms of process. They both involve formal complaints and answers; they both involve
adversaries squaring off in front of a decision maker; they both involve a formal presentation of
the parties’ respective evidence and arguments; they both involve a third party neutral who
makes a binding decision to resolve the parties’ dispute; and they both involve a decision making
so as to preserve due process but not permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration matters. As to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Volt, supra, these circuits limit that ruling to the procedures and systems utilized in the
arbitration up to the point of completion, after which time, the parties’ freedom to fashion their own arbitration
process has no bearing whatsoever on their ability to amend the statutorily prescribed standards governing federal
court review and jurisdiction. Kyocera, supra; cf., Hoeft, supra, 343 F.3d at 65 (parties can agree to preclude or
waive arbitral review); Katz v. Fenberg, 290 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
97

Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 11; Marsh v. Williams, 23 Cal. App. 4th 238, 244, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402 (1994).

98

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1294(d). An appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award is subject to a
finality requirement. If other issues remain unresolved in the trial court, the judgment confirming the arbitration
award is not final and cannot be appealed. Rubin v. Western Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1547-1548, 84
Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (1999) (award only appraised the amount of earthquake damage, liability phase still awaited trial
on the merits).

99

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1294(c); Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Mem. Hosp. Ass’n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085
n. 1, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1985).

100

Alexander v. Blue Cross of Calif., 88 Cal. App. 4th 1082, 1087, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (2001) (“Alexander”);
Pierotti v. Torian, 81 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553 (2000)

101

Alexander, supra; California Faculty Assn. v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 4th 935, 944-945, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1
(1998) (“California Faculty”); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 373, 376 fn. 9, 885 P.2d
994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531 (1994).
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process which requires that the decision be put in writing. Beyond these basic process
components, the similarity between arbitration and litigation ends. This is so for several reasons,
not the least of which is the orientation of these two very different processes. The courts serve
the public and, as such, exercise their power in a way that seeks to balance the interests of
society with the individual interests of the parties. In contrast, the orientation of an arbitration is
on the parties and finding or tailoring a remedy to address the particularities of their dispute and
meet their needs.
3.

Survey and Results

As part of the research for this paper, approximately 400 business litigators in Southern
California were surveyed in November 2005 for the purpose of testing their preference for
litigation over arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure for general civil disputes. The
survey102 was mailed to attorneys practicing in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. In addition to
asking about their preference for litigation over arbitration, the survey questions also sought
background information about the responding attorneys’ years in practice and their level of
experience with litigation, arbitration and appeals. It also solicited information as to any reasons
they might have for preferring litigation over arbitration besides the availability of appellate
review.
A.

Participants’ Backgrounds

As shown in Table 1, the pool of responding attorneys was weighted more heavily with
attorneys who had practiced ten or more years. This is surprising because the group to whom
questionnaires were sent was split fairly evenly between associate level and partner level
attorneys.

102

See Appendix A.
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Table 1
Survey Participants’ Years of Practicing Law

Less than 10 Years Experience
23
20.35%

Ten years experience or more
90
79.65%

19

As shown in Table 2, all sizes of firms were represented by the responding attorneys,
with fairly even distribution among the different size firms: approximately 28 percent were in
small-medium (11-50 attorney) firms; approximately 24 percent were in large (100+ attorney)
firms; approximately 20 percent were solo practitioners or in small (2-10 attorney) firms; and
about 6 percent were in large-medium (51-100 attorney) firms.
Table 2
Survey Participants’ Firm Situation

Qty.
%

23
20.35%

24
21.24%

32
28.32%

20

7
6.19%

27
23.89%

B.

Participants’ Experience

As detailed in Table 3, despite the fact that the majority of the responding attorneys had
been practicing ten or more years, they were fairly evenly represented in terms of their trial
experience: 40 percent reported having had five or fewer trials, with about 10 percent reporting
no trial experience, and 60 percent reported having had six or more trials, with about 26 percent
reporting 25 or more trials.
Table 3
Survey Participants’ Trial Experience

35

32
29

Number of Attorneys

30
25

21

20

16

15

12

10
5
0
0 Trials

10.6%

1-5 Trials

6-10 Trials

28.3%

14.1%

21

11-25 Trials

18.5%

25+ Trials

25.6%

As detailed in Table 4, the responding attorneys were less evenly represented in terms of
arbitration experience: 61 percent reported five or fewer arbitrations, with about 17 percent
reporting no arbitration experience at all, and 39 percent reported six or more arbitrations, with
about 13 percent reporting 25 or more arbitrations.
Insert Table 4
Survey Participants’ Arbitration Experience

Responses by Arbitration Experience

Number of Attorneys

60
49

50
40
30
20

17

20
11

14

10
0
0 Hearings

1-5

6-10

11-25

25+

Arbitration Hearings
17%

44%

10%

22

16%

13%

With regard to appellate experience, 92 of the 113 responding attorneys reported that they
had experience representing appellants, but only 86 of those attorneys responded to the question
concerning the outcomes of that experience in terms of reversal rates.103 With regard to
experience representing appellees, 88 of the 113 responding attorneys reported that they had
experience defending appeals, but only 83 of those attorneys responded to the question
concerning the outcomes of that experience in terms of being reversed.
As with the trial and arbitration experience charts discussed above, despite the fact that
the majority of the responding attorneys had been practicing ten or more years, the majority had
prosecuted or defended five or less appeals.104 Their reported success rate in prosecuting appeals
and obtaining reversal or defending appeals and being reversed is shown in Tables 5 and 6
below.
In prosecuting appeals, 30 percent of the responding attorneys reported that they
succeeded in obtaining a reversal about 10 percent of the time.105 Approximately 21 percent of
the responding attorneys reported a reversal rate of about 25 percent;106 28 percent reported a
reversal rate of about 50 percent;107 eight percent reported a reversal rate of 75 percent108; and 12
percent reported a 100 percent reversal rate.109 On this last response, those reporting a 100
percent reversal rate had prosecuted one to five appeals, suggesting that the responses could be
based upon a single appeal experience.
103

Interestingly, an attorney who responded that he or she had no appellate experience responded to the question
concerning reversal rates, reporting a 10 percent reversal rate. This is why in Table 5 there is a bar for a respondent
having had “0 Appeals” experience.

104

55 of the 92 attorneys with appellant experience (approximately 59.7%%) had prosecuted five or less appeals.
59 of the 88 attorneys with appellee experience (approximately 67%) had defended five or less appeals.

105

26 of the 86 responding attorneys (approximately 30%) were in this category. Of those 61.5 percent had
prosecuted five or less appeals and 38.5 percent had prosecuted six or more appeals.

106

18 of the 86 responding attorneys (approximately 21%) were in this category. Of those 38.8 percent had
prosecuted five or less appeals and 61.2 percent had prosecuted six or more appeals.

107

24 of the 86 responding attorneys (approximately 28%) were in this category. Of those 50 percent had
prosecuted five or less appeals and 50 percent had prosecuted six or more appeals.

108

7 of the 86 responding attorneys (approximately 8%) were in this category. Of those 57 percent had prosecuted
five or less appeals and 43 percent had prosecuted six or more appeals.

109

Significantly, attorneys in this category had prosecuted only one to five appeals. There were no attorneys with
six or more appeals reporting a 100 percent reversal rate.
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Table 5
Survey Participants’ Experience Representing Appellants
Appellant Experience

Qty.
%

1
1.15%

16
18.39%

10
11.49%

7
8.05%

11
12.64%

12
13.79%

12
13.79%

4
4.60%

3
3.45%

11
12.64%

In defending appeals, approximately four percent of the responding attorneys reported
that they had never been reversed. Interestingly, those attorneys had defended one to five
appeals, suggesting that the responses could be based upon a single appeal experience. About
half of the responding attorneys reported a 10 percent reversal experience and another 24 percent
reported a 25 percent reversal experience. These reported experiences are closely in line with the
statistics maintained by the California Judicial Council for all appeals filed with the state’s court
of appeals.110

110

Each year, the California Judicial Council compiles and publishes statistics and trend data for the state’s courts.
These reports are prepared under the provisions of section 6 of article VI of the California Constitution, which
requires the Judicial Council to survey the condition of business in state courts and to report and make
recommendations to the Governor and Legislature. See, courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/2_annual.htm.
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Table 6
Survey Participants’ Experience Representing Appellees
Appellee Experience

Qty.
%

3
3.61%

24

17

13

28.92%

20.48%

15.66%

25

7
8.43%

11
13.25%

5
6.02%

3
3.61%

As summarized in Tables 7 and 8, the statistics compiled by the California Judicial
Council over the last 10 years related to the disposition of civil appeals to the California Courts
of Appeal show a consistent 10-year trend in which, on average, 76 percent of all appeals
decided by written opinion were affirmed, three percent were dismissed and only 21 percent
resulted in a reversal of the underlying decision.111 If the statistics for appeals decided by written
opinion are combined with total appeals, the success rate drops from a 21 percent reversal rate to
a reversal rate of between 10 to 12 percent.112 This latter statistic is more in line with the
responding attorneys’ success rate in defending appeals113 than with their reported success rate in
prosecuting appeals.

111

See Table 7, infra.

112

See Table 8, infra.

113

In defending appeals and securing an affirmance of the judgment, 50 percent of responding attorneys reported a
10 percent reversal rate and an additional 25 percent of responding attorneys reported a 25 percent reversal rate. See
Table 6, supra.
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Table 8
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C.

Participants’ Beliefs

Irrespective of their actual experience, Table 9 shows that approximately 92 percent of
the responding attorneys believe that the likelihood of obtaining a reversal is 25 percent or less,
with almost half of those attorneys believing that the success rate on appeal is only ten percent.
Table 10 charts those beliefs next to the responding attorneys’ appellate experience.
Table 9
Survey Participants’ Beliefs re Appellate Success Rate

Qty.
#

48
43.64%

53
48.18%

8
7.27%

29

1
0.91%

Table 10
Survey Participants’ Beliefs and Appellate Experience

110

22

59

14

8

7

Appellee Experience

111
114

19

55

20

10

7

Appellant Experience

110
115

48

53

8

Believe Reversed
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88 out of 110, or 80 percent of the responding attorneys who answered the “appellee experience” question said
they had had experience representing appellees.

115

98 out of 111, or 82.8 percent of the responding attorneys who answered the “appellant experience” question
said they had had experience representing appellants.

116

100 percent of the responding attorneys who answered the “reversal belief” question had an opinion about the
reversal rate in California irrespective of their personal experience.
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D.

Participants’ Preferences

Notwithstanding their beliefs, appellate experience, trial experience or arbitration
experience, Table 9 shows that the overwhelming majority of attorney surveyed – 84 percent -prefer litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the time or more.117
Table 11

117

Of the 113 attorneys who returned questionnaires, 110 responded to Question 7, which whether the responding
attorney, if “given a choice between a judicial forum and an arbitration forum,” would recommend or select a
judicial forum over arbitration 100 percent of the time (Choice A), 75 percent of the time (Choice B), 50 percent of
the time (Choice C), 25 percent of the time (Choice D) or never (Choice E). Of the 110 responding attorneys, 93
said that they would choice a judicial forum (i.e., litigation) 50 percent of the time or more.
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If the responding attorneys’ preference for litigation over arbitration is charted based on
their trial experience, Table 10 suggests that the more trial experience an attorney had, the
stronger his or her preference for that forum. For example, Table 3 shows that 29 of the
responding attorneys reported having had more than 25 trials. According to Table 10,
approximately 55 percent of those attorneys prefer litigation over arbitration 75 percent of the
time or more and 96 percent of those attorneys prefer litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the
time or more. Likewise, Table 10 the lack of trial experience had very little bearing on the
preference for litigation over arbitration. In this study, 35 percent of attorneys with five or less
trials reported that they still preferred litigation over arbitration 75 percent of the time or more
and 81 percent of those attorneys would recommend litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the
time or more.
Table 12
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If the responding attorneys’ preference for litigation over arbitration is charted based on
their arbitration experience, Table 11 shows that irrespective of their level of arbitration
experience the responding attorneys preferred litigation. In this regard, 46 percent responded
that they would recommend litigation over arbitration 75 percent of the time or more and 84
percent responded that they would recommend litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the time
or more.
Table 13

E.

Other Responses

In addition to surveying attorney perceptions about the value of appellate review as a
reason for preferring litigation over arbitration, the survey also asked attorneys to state any other
reasons they might have for preferring litigation over arbitration. This question elicited a broad
assortment of responses.118 A few of those responses are summarized in Table 14, and reveal
bad experiences in arbitration; lack of confidence in arbitrators as decision makers; a higher level
118

See, Appendix 2 for broader summary of responses given with respect to other reasons for preferring litigation
over arbitration.
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of comfort and confidence in the court system; and frustration with arbitrators deciding matters
by “splitting the baby” and not following legal precedent.
Table 14

•

I don’t like Arbitrators. They seem interested in prolonging hearings and the
process. They get paid by the hour. Also, they apply the law wrong and under
current CA law, that is not a ground to challenge an award.

•

I’ve been taken advantage of by Arbitrators.

•

More procedural certainty/clarity (rules and procedure in court is generally more
clear)

•

I prefer the formality, the rules and guidelines and what I believe is greater
attention by Judges versus Arbitrators in hearing the matter.

•

Cheaper; allows for discovery; I know the rules

•

Rules of evidence and code of civil procedure protections are more uniformly
enforced.

•

Arbitration results most often “split the baby.”

•

A Judge is expected to follow the law; an Arbitrator is not.

•

Judicial decisions are more consistent and better.

•

I prefer litigation because Judges are neutral.

•

Discovery rules apply in litigation.

•

Often arbitrators do not understand the law or the evidence, or the ruling is
simply wrong.

•

Many arbitrators are biased in favor of “repeat clients” such as large corporations
or law firms.

•

It’s difficult to constrain the Arbitrator to the arbitration agreement and limit his
power.

•

I prefer litigation because 1) there is a record; 2) rules of evidence matter; 3) the
Judge has clerks and research staff; 4) I don’t have to pay for the Judge’s time; 5)
the Judge has no profit incentive.
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E.

Conclusion

If the direct question about whether the responding attorneys preferred litigation over
arbitration was not enough to confirm that bias, the responses to the question asking for any
additional reasons, discussed in Section D, above, certainly confirms that preference. What is
particularly telling about the additional reasons given by the responding attorneys is that
irrespective of whether they would recommend litigation over arbitration 50 percent of the time
or 100 percent of the time, the additional responses show that 75 percent of the responding
attorneys have a high level of suspicion or distrust about the arbitration process or have had very
negative arbitration experiences.119 It can be no coincidence that the 75 percent of respondents
who provided additional responses corresponds almost directly with the 84 percent of attorneys
who responded that they prefer litigation over arbitration.120
4.

Misperceptions About Arbitration
A.

No Right to Appellate Review

In support of his or her preference for litigation over arbitration, one attorney wrote that
the right to appellate review serves as a “cross-check” for “wacky decisions.” That may be true,
but it is unlikely that 7,482 wacky decisions are being issued each year in California121 because
the reversal rate from those appeals is only between 10 and 20 percent.122 Alternatively, if that
many wacky decisions are being issued each year, then the appellate process is only redressing a
small percentage of those decisions since the affirmance rate is between 80 and 90 percent each
year.123 Moreover, the survey results show that most attorneys are aware of the slim likelihood
of achieving a reversal through an appeal,124 which suggests that the real value of the right to
appeal is strategic: i.e., that it leaves the proceedings open and the ultimate outcome uncertain

119

Of the 113 attorneys who responded to the survey, 85 attorneys (or 75%) responded to the question regarding
their reasons, in addition to appeal, for preferring litigation over arbitration.

120

See, Table 9, supra.

121

This number represents the average number of appeals filed in California over the past 10 years, based on the
California Judicial Council’s data as summarized in Table 8, supra.

122

See, Tables 7 and 8, supra.

123

See, Tables 7 and 8, supra.

124

See, Table 9, supra.
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and perhaps creates an opportunity for the appellant to negotiate an out-of-court solution of the
dispute with the appellee.
As mentioned in Section 2(B), in an effort to address the risk of unpredictable or biased
decision-making, without sacrificing the benefits of arbitration, parties have tried contracting for
expanded judicial review as part of their agreement to arbitrate.125 Some courts, including the
Ninth Circuit up until 2003,126 have recognized those provisions based on a literal reading of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees,127 which held that
parties may specify by contract the rules under which their arbitration will be conducted.128 The
Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits have indicated that they are willing to honor contract provisions
which expand judicial review beyond that provided by Section 10(a) of the FAA.129 These
circuits generally emphasize that the purpose of the FAA is to enforce the terms of private
arbitration agreements, including terms specifying the scope of review of arbitral decisions. In
125

See, foonote 95, supra.

126

In 1984, Kyocera Corporation (“Kyocera”) entered into an agreement with Lapine Technology Corporation
(“LaPine”) to manufacture and supply computer disk drives. In May 1987, LaPine instituted proceedings in federal
court seeking damages and an injunction compelling Kyocera to continue supplying disk drives under the alleged
terms of the agreement. Kyocera moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the
agreement. That motion was granted and in September 1987 an arbitration was convened. The arbitration panel
determined that Kyocera had breached the agreement and that the breach was the proximate cause of damage to
LaPine. Damages of $243,133,881 were awarded, plus attorney’s fees of $14,500,000. Kyocera filed a motion in
the district court seeking to vacate the award under the FAA and the additional review standards created under the
agreement for vacatur “where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence” or “where
the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.” The district court determined that it was bound to apply only the
statutory grounds for review established under the FAA and refused to enforce the expanded judicial review
provisions of the parties’ agreement. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
federal court review of an arbitration award is not necessarily limited to the standards set forth in the FAA, and
remanded to allow the district court to apply the parties’ contractually expanded standard of review of unsupported
factual findings and errors of law. Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“LaPine I”). On remand, the district court reviewed the arbitration decision according to the non-statutory
standards specified in the parties’ agreement and confirmed the award. Again, Kyocera timely appealed the district
court decision to the Ninth Circuit. In 2002, a three-judge panel unanimously affirmed the district court’s
confirmation of the arbitration award. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 299 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
2002) (LaPine II). Kyocera timely filed a request for rehearing en banc and, on December 17, 2002, the Ninth
Circuit granted that request. The court of appeal then ordered and received supplemental briefing devoted entirely
to the LaPine I issue of private parties’ power to dictate the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award and
the ramifications thereof. On August 29, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the
arbitration award, but in so doing corrected the law of the circuit regarding the proper standard for review of arbitral
decisions under the FAA. Kyocera, supra, 341 F.3d at 994.
127

489 U.S. 468.

128

Id. at 478-479.

129

See, footnote 95, supra.

36

the aforementioned circuits, the right to expanded judicial review of an arbitral award is
currently available by contract.
As might be expected, the federal courts are split on the issue of whether private parties
can expand or create judicial review of arbitral awards to allow some level of review for errors of
fact and/or law. In contrast to the Circuits discussed above, the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and, most
recently, Ninth Circuits have severed and refused to enforce such clauses (or have hinted that
they will do so) on constitutional grounds: namely, that the public cannot contract to expand
appellate jurisdiction.130 Additionally, the few state courts that have weighed in on this issue,
California included,131 have expressed the same concerns about allowing private parties to create
or expand appellate jurisdiction.132 In these jurisdictions and states, contracts seeking to create
or expand judicial review of arbitral decisions will not be enforced.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the split among the circuits, relying on an
arbitration clause in which the parties agree to expanded judicial review of the arbitral award is
“chancy and unpredictable.”133 However, contracting for appellate review within the arbitration
process and without the involvement of the judiciary is a suggestion that was made by Judge
Richard Posner in Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times in 1991,134 and has since
been embraced by arbitrators and provider organizations alike.135
130

See footnote 95, supra.

131

See, Crowell, supra, 95 Cal. App.4th 730 (interpreting the California Arbitration Act); CC Partners, supra, 101
Cal. App. 4th 635 (same); Little., supra, 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (same).
132

See, In re County of Chemung, 277 A.D.2d 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2000) (interpreting New York’s
arbitration statute); Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting Michigan’s Arbitration Act);
Chicago, Southshore & South Bend R.. v. Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dept., 682 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. App. 1997),
rev’d other grounds, 184 Ill. 151 (1998) (interpreting the Illinois Arbitration Act).
133

Paul Bennett Morrow, A Practical Approach to Affording Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an
Appellate Arbitrator, 60-OCT Disp. Resol. J. 10 (2005) (“Morrow Article”); see also Lee Goldman, Contractually
Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 171, 173 (2003) (the legal status of such clauses
remains uncertain).

134

935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).

135

See, e.g., Morrow Article, supra, 60-OCT Disp. Resol. J. 10; JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure
(2003) (“JAMS Appeal Rules”), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp; International
Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“CPR”) Arbitration Appeal Procedure (“CPR Appeal Rules”),
available at http://www.cpradr.org/arb_appeal_intro.asp?M=9.7. The rationale behind the CPR Appeal Rules is that
while that organization does not wish to encourage widespread appeals from arbitration awards, it nevertheless
wants to “allay the concerns of attorneys and clients regarding the rare arbitration award that blatantly fails to apply
the law or for which there is scant support in the record.” Id.
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Most provider organization rules allow the parties to modify or supplement the rules that
will govern their arbitration,136 and should be flexible enough to allow the parties to agree to an
appeal within the arbitration process. However, two ADR organizations have adopted formal
rules that provide a formal structure for “internal” appellate review.137 Those rules permit an
appeal based on perceived errors of law and / or fact and, like the judicial appellate process,
prescribe strict time frames and briefing requirements to prosecute such an appeal.138 Like
judicial appeals, the rules governing arbitral appeals authorize the appellate arbitrator to affirm,
reverse or modify the original award based on an error of fact or law or because grounds for
vacatur are found to exist. The arbitral appeal process requires the appellate arbitrator to prepare
a written statement explaining the appellate decision. While there is very little literature and no
case law on these “internal” arbitration appeals, it would appear that the decision reached by the
appellate arbitrator should expedite the award confirmation process because, presumably, any
vacatur issues would have been decided and that decision would have collateral estoppel effect in
the court confirmation proceedings.139
Regardless of whether the challenge to an arbitration award is made in the courts on
vacatur grounds or within the arbitration tribunal on error and vacatur grounds, the real problem
for the party seeking such review is not so much the standard of review that is available to them,
but the lack of a record concerning both the proceedings and the arbitrator’s reasoning
process.140 In a court of law, all proceedings are recorded in some fashion without the request or

136

Rule 2 of the JAMS Rules provides that parties “may agree on any procedures not specified herein or in lieu of
these Rules that are consistent with the applicable law and JAMS policies . . . .”
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp. Rule R-1 of the AAA Commercial Rules provides that the
parties “by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these rules. . . .”
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
137

JAMS Appeal Rules, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp; CPR Appeal Rules,
available at http://www.cpradr.org/arb_appeal_intro.asp?M=9.7.
138

Id.

139

See, footnote 76, supra.

140

See, e.g., Atlas Floor Covering v Crescent House & Garden, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 211, 215, 333 P.2d 194
(1958) (record of the arbitration proceedings presented to the trial court and then to the court of appeal was
incomplete because there was a reporter’s transcript of only one of the two days of hearing and the transcript was
not certified by the arbitrators as the official record of the proceedings). only In an arbitration proceeding, unless
the parties make arrangements for a stenographic record, “the record” consists of the paperwork submitted by the
parties, the interim award and the final order. The arbitrator's notes, workpapers and mental deliberations are
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special arrangements of any party. That is not true in arbitrations. In an arbitration, any party
desiring a stenographic record must make arrangements and pay for the court reporter.141 In
order to constitute the “official record” of the arbitration proceeding, it must be provided to the
arbitrator and made available to the other parties for inspection.142 Moreover, in court
proceedings, the parties can request findings of fact and conclusions of law or submit special
interrogatories to the jury at the time of the evidentiary proceedings. That is not necessarily the
case in an arbitration proceeding unless requested by both parties and agreed to by the
arbitrator.143 In cases involving high-stakes outcomes, complex factual issues, highly specialized
areas of law or developing areas of law, the need for a record should be anticipated at the outset
of the proceedings in order to assure that the level of review which is available in either forum is
meaningful.
B.

Arbitrators “Split the Baby”

In response to the survey, several attorneys wrote that they do not like arbitration because
arbitrators will “split the baby” rather than decide the merits of the case.144 Many of these
attorneys also wrote that they suspected that the reason why arbitrators “split the baby” is to
curry favor with both sides by not deciding against them on all points in the hopes of being
considered by both parties for future arbitration appointments.145 As discussed in this section,
there may be some misperception or misunderstanding concerning the guidelines and constraints
which govern an arbitrator’s decision-making process.
With regard to the expressed concern that arbitrators decide matters by simply “splitting
the baby,” such decision-making is contrary to an arbitrator’s code of ethics. For example, the
AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes requires that an arbitrator make a
immune from discovery or disclosure. See, e.g., AAA Commercial Rules, R-26. Similarly, the arbitrator is not
obligated to render a “reasoned award” or to provide findings of fact or conclusions of law unless requested by the
parties prior to the arbitrator’s appointment. AAA Commercial Rules,
R-42.
141

AAA Commercial Rules, R-26.

142

Id.

143

See, e.g., AAA Commercial Rules R-42.

144

See, Appendix 2.

145

Id.
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decision only “after careful deliberation,” that he or she “decide all issues submitted for
determination,” and that he or she do so “justly” and by exercising “independent judgment.”146
The Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines adopted by JAMS echo the AAA Code of Ethics and
specifically add that an arbitrator’s award should not be influenced “by any interest in potential
future case referrals by any of the Parties or counsel, nor should an arbitrator issue an Award that
reflects a compromise position in order to achieve such acceptability.”147
With regard to the concern that arbitrators decide matters in a way that they hope will be
acceptable to both parties so as to curry favor for future appointments, to the extent such
decision-making conduct has occurred in the past, it should have been curtailed in California by
the Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (“New Ethics Rules”),
which became effective on July 1, 2002.148 Prior to the adoption of the New Ethics Rules, a
“rule of reasonableness” governed conflict of interest disclosures, meaning that the arbitrator
only had a duty to use reasonable efforts to conduct a reasonable inquiry regarding conflicts of
interest and to make disclosures to the parties regarding same.149 This was a subjective standard
that varied on a case-by- case and arbitrator-by- arbitrator basis and served to undermine public
confidence in the neutrality of the arbitrators appointed to hear their matters. In 2001, the
California Arbitration Act was amended to require that all persons serving as neutral arbitrators
146

Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, American Arbitration Association, Canon V (2004),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958.

147

Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines, JAMS, Guidelines VIII, http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/ethics_print.asp.
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Cal. R. Ct., Appendix, Div. VI (Thomson West 2006). In 2001, Section 1281.85 was added to the California
Code of Civil Procedure and requires that all persons serving as neutral arbitrators in private arbitration matters
comply with the New Ethics Rules. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285.85(a). It was through Section 1281.85 that the
California Judicial Council was instructed to adopt ethical standards for all neutral arbitrators to become effective
July 1, 2002. The disclosure and disqualification provisions of Section 1281.9 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure were then expanded to include any ground specific for disqualification of judges under Section 170.1 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, as well as any matters required to be disclosed by the New Ethics Rules.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.9. Finally Stats 2001, c. 362 (S.B. 475), § 5.
Those ethics standards are set forth in Division VI of the Appendix to the California Rules of Court. The new law
significantly revised the disclosure requirements and procedures for disqualifying arbitrators in private arbitration
matters, and went far beyond anything theretofore on the books regulating the private arbitration process. The new
law was believed to be necessary due to what the California Legislature perceived to be a lack of public confidence
in private arbitration, which perception was at odds with the general purpose of arbitration law which is to “advance
arbitration as an alternative to litigation.” Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding
Recommendations for Changes to California Arbitration Law, 2003 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L. J. 1, 3 (2004).
149

Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, Nancy H. Rogers, Sarah Rudolph Cole, Dispute Resolution /
Negotiation, Mediation and Other Processes (Aspen 4th ed 2003), p. 279.
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in private arbitration matters comply with the New Ethics Rules.150 The California Arbitration
Act was further amended to add a provision which vests the parties with the power to disqualify
an arbitrator without concurrence by a court or other supervising body.151 If an arbitrator makes
an award and either fails to make the required disclosures or fails to disqualify himself or herself
upon receipt of a timely demand by one of the parties, the award must be vacated.152 Under the
New Ethics Rules and amended vacatur provisions, it is unlikely that an arbitrator will receive
successive appointments unless he or she conducts arbitration proceedings fairly as to all parties
and decides the matter on the merits.
C.

Arbitrators do not Follow the Law

In response to the survey, one attorney wrote that “arbitrators do not understand the law .
. . or the ruling is simply wrong.” This sentiment was echoed by a number of other responding
attorneys who felt that arbitrators lacked knowledge of, misunderstood or misapplied the law in
reaching their decision. One of the things these comments reveal is that attorneys tend to
generalize their concept of what law is into something that is perhaps static, easy to define and
generally recognized and accepted. Black’s Law Dictionary defines law elusively as a “body of
rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular jurisdiction apply in deciding
controversies brought before them.”153 Another definition of law was offered by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, who stated that “the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”154 Neither definition of what constitutes “the
law” is enlightening. It is submitted that the definition of law is more of a guiding principal in
which the concept of law may be widely accepted, but what underlies the law remains disputed
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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285.85(a). It was through Section 1281.85 that the California Judicial Council was
instructed to adopt ethical standards for all neutral arbitrators to become effective July 1, 2002. The disclosure and
disqualification provisions of the California Arbitration Act were then expanded to include any ground specific for
disqualification of judges under Section 170.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as well as any matters
required to be disclosed by the New Ethics Rules. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.9.
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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.91. In this regard, an arbitrator is required to disqualify himself or herself upon the
demand of any party. Id.
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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2(a)(6); see, footnote 87, supra.
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Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2005).

154

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897).
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and difficult to define.155 The above comments suggest that there is an easily defined, accepted
and recognized “legal standard” and that simply is not true. While the tenet of the law may be
accepted in principal, the application of the law will vary from case to case, whether in a court of
law or an arbitral tribunal. That is a reality for disputants and their counsel because in any
tribunal decisions are made by people, not machines.
The above comments and concerns correctly recognize that, in terms of legal precedent,
arbitrators have greater latitude to grant relief from that which is available in a court of law,156
and are not bound or restricted by legal precedent.157 That being said, it is generally accepted
that arbitrators are expected to temper their broad decision-making authority so as to not offend
public policy, violate statutory or common law, or otherwise transcend the limits of the parties’
arbitration agreement or the matters submitted for decision.158 The flexibility an arbitrator has in
deciding a matter points up the need for counsel to take an active role in selecting an arbitrator to
hear a given matter. In this regard, the comments suggest that responding attorneys may not
appreciate the power they have to select their decision-maker159 and thereby direct or influence
the quality of the outcome in their client’s case. Under some provider rules, the parties may
directly name the arbitrator or specify the criteria to be utilized in selecting arbitrator candidates
for appointment.160 Where the parties need help in identifying candidates, some provider
organizations have administrative staff available to work with counsel to develop a list of criteria
that can be used to develop a list of potential arbitrators satisfying the parties’ criteria for an ideal
arbitrator.161 Moreover, for large, complex disputes, the AAA offers an Enhanced Neutral
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Rex R. Perschbacher and Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2004), pp. 10-32.
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Selection Process which gives the parties an opportunity to interview potential arbitrator
candidates as part of the selection process.162 While an arbitrator’s decision-making authority
may be broadly defined under the law, the parties in an arbitration have an opportunity to counter
that perceived deficiency through the arbitrator selection process. However, for the selection
process to end with the appointment of a qualified arbitrator, the parties’ attorneys must
understand the strengths and weaknesses of their clients’ case at the outset, which is a very
different situation from that encountered in litigation where the decision-maker is not appointed
until the matter has been investigated and prepared and is ready to proceed to trial.
One final insight provided by the above comments is that the responding attorneys may
not appreciate the arbitrator’s source of decision-making power. The first source of authority is
the parties’ arbitration agreement, which may be broadly or generically stated.163 The second
source of power comes from the parties’ statement of the issues in their submission agreement,
which statement can be refined and narrowed at the preliminary hearing.164 Arbitration
agreements are creatures of contract and must be analyzed and enforced as such. It follows,
therefore, that an arbitrator’s power derives from and is limited by the agreement to arbitrate, and
that the parties are free to fashion agreements that restrict the arbitrator’s authority to decide
certain matters, as well as the arbitrator’s discretion in fashioning an award.165
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D.

Arbitrators do not Follow Evidentiary Rules

In response to the survey, several attorneys responded that they do not like arbitration or
are not comfortable with it as a process because the rules of evidence are not applied. These
comments correctly recognize that state and federal rules of evidence do not govern the
admissibility or exclusion of evidence in arbitration proceedings, unless the parties have
expressly so agreed.166 In this regard, the California Arbitration Act provides that the parties to
an arbitration “are entitled to be heard, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses
appearing at the hearing, but rules of evidence and rules of procedure need not be observed.”167
That being said, what constitutes evidence is not really a matter of rule. Evidence is testimony,
documents and tangible objects that tend to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact,168
and parties to an arbitration must present that which qualifies as evidence to support their claims
and defenses.169 To the extent that parties offer something other than evidence, the arbitrator
does not have to go through the formality of excluding it. He or she can simply disregard it in
rendering a decision.
Even though parties have wide latitude with respect to the evidence they can offer in an
arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator can exclude evidence that is cumulative, repetitive,
irrelevant or immaterial, provided that all parties are afforded a fair opportunity to present their
case. 170 Moreover, in the context of a breach of contract dispute, the arbitrator may be required
to exclude extrinsic evidence if the contract at issue contains an explicit integration and merger
clause.171 When called upon to exclude evidence, arbitrators are understandably conservative in
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making such rulings because one statutory ground for vacatur of an award is “the refusal of the
arbitrators to hear evidence materials to the controversy.”172
For the trial lawyer who finds himself or herself in the arbitral forum, the opportunity to
shape the case by seeking to exclude evidence are minimized because arbitration “has a life of its
own outside the judicial system”173 and operates under different, perhaps more liberal, rules of
procedure and evidence. At the end of the day, however, both systems seek to find the truth and
to decide the dispute on its merits. Rather than looking to exclude evidence, counsel in an
arbitration matter should instead focus the arbitrator’s attention on the ultimate issues to be
decided and direct the arbitrator’s attention to the evidence that is relevant / material to that
inquiry and that which is not. In litigation, the objective may be to have the opposing party’s
evidence excluded per the rules of evidence. In arbitration, that evidence comes in and the
objective is to then question the sufficiency of the opposing party’s evidence or the weight it
should be given as compared to other, arguably more credible, evidence.
E.

There is no Discovery in Arbitration

In response to the survey, several attorneys responded that one of the reasons they prefer
litigation over arbitration is because there is no discovery in arbitration. While it is true that the
general rule is that discovery in aid of arbitration is not allowed under California or federal
law,174 there are several exceptions which afford discovery for specific types of disputes. For
example, parties who agree to arbitrate wrongful death or personal injury claims have the same
discovery rights and obligations as in civil actions, except that depositions may not be taken
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without prior leave of the arbitrator.175 Similarly, in arbitration matters involving uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage claims between insureds and their insurers, full discovery rights
apply.176 A certain level of discovery is available in employer-employee disputes involving an
arbitration clause in a pre-employment agreement. In these cases, the employer is deemed to
have impliedly consented to sufficient discovery so as to enable the employee to vindicate
certain statutory and common law claims.177 Finally, because arbitration is a creature of
contract, the parties are free to define in their agreement the extent of discovery to be had in an
arbitration proceeding. In these circumstances, the extent to which parties will be allowed to
obtain discovery will be a function of the arbitration agreement, any applicable arbitration rules
and the temperament of the arbitrator(s).178
Absent an agreement, there are cases which say that discovery is available only if
extraordinary circumstances are found to exist,179 and that a party’s alleged need for discovery in
order to develop evidence to prove its claims does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance
that will permit discovery.180 However, the more reasoned view of practicing arbitrators is to
allow discovery where it is needed so as to afford all parties a full and fair exploration of the
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issues in dispute.181 In this regard, a finding of substantial need involves two factors. The first is
the nature, relevance and importance of the proposed discovery, and the second is the ability to
obtain the facts or documents from other sources within a party’s control.182
The real problem encountered with respect to discovery in aid of arbitration concerns that
which is directed against third parties.183 The FAA provides that an arbitrator may summon “any
person to attend before them” and to bring with them “any book, record, document, or paper
which may be deemed material.”184 Similarly, the California Arbitration Act grants an arbitrator
the power to issue a subpoena requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents at an arbitration proceeding.185 With the exception of the special types of
proceedings described at the beginning of this section, there is no statutory authority empowering
an arbitrator to order nonparties to appear at depositions or to demand that nonparties provide the
litigating parties with documents during prehearing discovery. In terms of the plain wording of
the arbitration statutes, an arbitrator’s power over nonparties is limited to requiring witnesses to
appear and produce documents at the arbitration hearing; it does not encompass prehearing
discovery.186 That being said, a number of federal courts have held that an arbitrator has implicit
power under the FAA to require a third party to testify at a deposition and to issue subpoenas for
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the production and review of documents before the hearing.187 In keeping with this apparent
move to construe the arbitration process as something more akin to traditional, litigation,
extensive revisions have been proposed to the Uniform Arbitration Act,188 which include express
provisions for depositions, the subpoena of witnesses and the use of any other discovery process
that may be appropriate to the resolution of the dispute.189
G.

Conclusion

Arbitration is a dispute resolution process that operates outside the court system and, for
the most part, involves the courts only when arbitral orders or awards are sought to be enforced
through the legal process. While it is an adjudicatory process, arbitration is not litigation. It is
an alternative to litigation. However, as the comments in the preceding sections illustrate, many
of the criticisms concerning the arbitration process stem from comparisons to the traditional
litigation process and the perceived shortcomings that exist because arbitration is not governed
by the same doctrines, rules or procedures. The object of the discussion in the preceding sections
was not to validate or repudiate any particular criticism. Rather, the purpose was to offer a
perspective for consideration: namely, that unlike the litigation process which is directed by a
judge and governed by rules and procedures set by the legislature and courts, arbitration is a
private process that is directed by the parties and governed by whatever procedures they want to
govern the determination of their disputes.190 In this regard, many of the perceived ills identified
by the responding attorneys could be remedied by the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, by their
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statement of the submission to arbitration, by the selection of the arbitrator(s) and by reorienting
the preparation and presentation of their cases to vacatur grounds which, unfortunately, serve as
a backdrop to how many aspects of an arbitration are administered.
5.

Concluding Remarks

The survey which served as the foundation for this paper provided information and
insight into attorney perceptions about the arbitration process beyond anything anticipated at the
outset of this effort. That the responding attorneys favored litigation over arbitration was no
surprise, but it was a surprise that they placed a high value on the right to appeal as part of the
reason for that preference even though hard statistics and their own beliefs showed that the
likelihood of obtaining a reversal of a challenged decision is only about 10 percent. This
suggests that the perceived value of appellate review is more strategic than substantive. To that
end, the same strategic advantage exists in arbitration by challenging confirmation of an
arbitration award on vacatur grounds and taking an appeal of the decision on that matter.
With regard to the responding attorneys’ other reasons for preferring litigation over
arbitration, it was a surprise to learn that an overwhelming majority of the participants held such
a broad assortment of negative perceptions about the arbitral process. To be sure, the arbitration
process is very different from litigation, but its objective is the same: to provide parties with a
full and fair hearing and to then make a decision that resolves the dispute based on the evidence
presented. To the extent that the arbitration process has perceived weaknesses, it is submitted
that many of them are party-controlled and can be remedied through the wording of the parties’
agreement to arbitrate, through the statement of their submission to the arbitrator(s) and through
their selection of the arbitrator(s).
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